



## DPI 101D: Political Institutions and Public Policy

Spring 2013, Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:10 – 11:30 am, L230

Instructor:

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Instructor's office hours:

Thursdays, 2:00 – 6:00 pm.

### Course Description

This is a course about the effects of major political factors on public policy. It addresses central debates in comparative politics to inquire about critical real-world questions. Why are some states able to implement growth-enhancing policies while others fail? Why do some countries provide universal health care while others do not? What institutional arrangements help negotiation and cooperation in deeply divided societies? We look at these questions through the lens of comparative politics in order to understand the conditions under which different political regimes, institutional designs (systems of government, electoral systems, power-sharing arrangements, economic and political pacts) and public policies (especially social policies) are adopted, and to learn about their political and distributive effects. We further analyze critical political actors involved in policy making (political parties, social movements, labor unions) in order to understand under what conditions they pursue different goals, adopt different strategies (i.e., form mass organizations, extend programmatic linkages to voters/members, etc.) and how they influence policy outcomes.

Aside from exploring political aspects that shape public policies, an important additional aim of this course is to help you hone your analytical skills and presentational abilities. In your professional lives, you will often be required to explain complex policy choices with verbal economy and analytical precision. The exercises in this class are designed to help you learn these skills. They will also help to prepare you for Spring Exercise, the policy simulation that is the capstone of the first year of the Master in Public Policy program.

## Course Expectations, Assignments, and Grading

**Expectations:** This class combines lectures, discussions (both of specific cases and of conceptual issues suggested by the readings), and in-class exercises. In order for the class to work, you must stay on top of the cases and academic readings, think about the discussion questions that appear at the end of each case, and come to class ready to participate, ask questions, debate with your colleagues, and contribute to our collective enterprise. In order to nudge you in the right direction, attendance is mandatory, and we will allocate 10% of your grade to class participation. We will work hard to create an environment of mutual respect and professionalism that will allow students to take risks, pose questions, and stake out bold positions.

**Readings and Class Preparation:** Prior to most of our meetings, you will need to read 2-3 academic works as well as a short, 2-4 page case. We will use theories and frameworks introduced in the academic readings and in class to understand each case. In preparing for each class, please start by reading the case, and then move on to the academic readings, using the discussion questions at the end of the case to guide your reading. Finally, jot down a few notes or thoughts on the discussion questions that you can refer to during class discussion.

All cases for the course will be posted on the course website. Many of the academic readings are available online through links provided below and on the course website. The remaining readings are in course packets available for purchase from the CMO.

**Assignments:** The bulk (70%) of your final grade is determined by your performance on two assignments—two policy memos and two group briefings. The schedule is:

<i>Assignment</i>	<i>Date Distributed</i>	<i>Date Due</i>
Individual memo 1	February 19	February 28
Group briefing 1		March 7
Individual memo 2	March 12	March 26
Group briefing 2		April 2

Requests for extensions will only be granted in exceptional circumstances, and only when accompanied by a note from a doctor, dean, or other suitably authoritative source. Unexcused late assignments will be penalized one point (on the six point scale) for each day they are overdue. Please understand that there can be no exceptions to this policy.

The final 20% of your grade is determined by an **in-class final exam on April 9**, the last day of class.

**Grading:** Each assignment will be scored along the same six-point performance index used in Spring Exercise:

6 = Distinction even by the standards expected of a professional practitioner

- 5 = Fully meets the standards expected of a professional practitioner
- 4 = Distinction by the standards expected of a professional school graduate student
- 3 = Average by the standards expected of a professional school graduate student
- 2 = Below average by the standards expected of a professional school graduate student
- 1 = Unacceptable by the standards expected of a professional school graduate student

We use this system instead of simple letter grades because it gives you the clearest possible sense of how your performance would be evaluated in the real world, against an absolute standard of professionalism. It is a high standard: past experience in this and other sections of DPI-101 has been that scores of 6 and 5 are rarely awarded. This is to be expected: if you were already performing at the standard of a professional, you wouldn't need to be here! However, it is our belief and experience that you will meet this standard by the time you have completed your course of study at the Kennedy School. That is part of what this course is designed to do.

In any event, your final grade for the course will not be based on your absolute score on any of the graded exercises, but rather on how well you performed *relative* to other students in the class. In other words, the course is graded on a curve, meaning that you probably will not need to have earned a 5 or 6 in all of your assignments in order to achieve a final grade of A. The Kennedy School's grading curve is as follows: the top 10 to 15% of the class will receive a grade of A; the next 20 to 25% will receive a grade of A-; the next 30 to 40% will receive a grade of B+; the next 20 to 25% will receive a grade of B; and the lowest 5 to 10% will receive a grade of B- or lower. In order to diminish anxiety over grades, we will try to be as generous as the above distribution allows. Moreover, we will do our best to make grading criteria for each assignment transparent at the outset, and to ensure that you always have a good sense of where you stand in terms of your course performance.

**Academic Honesty:** You will be doing a lot of writing in this course, so it's important that you adhere to the Kennedy School's policies regarding proper academic practice. The academic code can be found [here](#). We urge you to read it. Please pay particular attention to the section on plagiarism, which is the appropriation of others' words and ideas without proper attribution. The disciplinary consequences of this violation are dire, so please take care to quote and cite your sources. We will discuss plagiarism in the course, but it is your responsibility to make sure that the words and ideas that appear in your work are your own, and that you give credit where credit is due.

**Policy on laptops and smart-phones:** In our experience, the use of laptops and smart-phones in class degrades the teaching and learning environment for everyone in the classroom. At the same time, we recognize that students may not be used to taking notes by hand, and may wish to conserve paper by doing the readings on-screen as opposed to printing them out. Therefore, while the use of smart-phones is strictly prohibited, students may use their laptops to take notes in class or to refer to the readings. You may not, however, surf the web or check your email. Students caught doing this will lose one point from their overall class participation grade for each instance.

## Schedule of Meetings and Readings

*Note: In addition to the academic readings listed below, prior to some of the sessions you are required to read the case posted on the class website and think about the case discussion questions.*

### Tuesday, January 29: Introductory Lecture

### Thursday, January 31: Political Regime and Regime Change

- Dahl, Robert, 1971, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale University Press, pp. 1 - 16.
- Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, 1997, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics*, 49(2), pp. 155-183. [Link](#)
- Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, 2012, "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule," *American Political Science Review*, 106 (3), pp. 496-516.

### Tuesday, February 5: Regime Type and Policy Making

- David Lake and Matthew Baum, 2001, "The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services," *Comparative Political Studies*, 34, pp. 587-621. [Link](#)
- Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 1995, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (3), pp. 79-97.

### Thursday, February 7: Authoritarian Continuity

- Larry Diamond, 2010, "Why are there no Arab Democracies?," *Journal of Democracy* 21(1). [Link](#)
- Eva Bellin, 2004, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36 (2), pp. 139-157.

### Tuesday, February 12: The State: Bureaucracy and State Capacity

- Jeffrey Herbst, 1996, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," *International Security*, 21(3), pp.120-144.
- Peter Evans, 1989, "Predatory, Developmental and other Apparatuses: a Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State" *Sociological Forum* 4(4), pp. 561-587.
- Robert Bates, 1981, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 119-132.

**Thursday, February 14: Democratic Institutions and Policymaking I: Legislatures and Executives**

- Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, 1997, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal,” *Comparative Politics* 29(4), pp. 449-471. [Link](#)
- Juan Linz, 1990, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (1), pp. 51-69.

**Tuesday, February 19: Democratic Institutions and Policymaking II: Electoral rules**

- Pippa Norris, 1997, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian, and Mixed Systems,” *International Political Science Review*, 18 (3). [Link](#)
- Donald Horowitz, 2003, “Electoral Systems: A Primer for Decision Makers,” *Journal of Democracy* 14 (4), pp. 115-127.
- Torben Iversen and David Soskice, 2006, “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” *American Political Science Review* 100 (2), pp. 165-181. [Link](#)

*First assignment handed out*

**Thursday, February 21: Political Parties and Party Systems**

- Maurice Duverger, 1972, “Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System,” in *Party Politics and Pressure Groups*, Crowell, pp. 23-32.
- Martin Shefter, 1977, “Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy,” *Politics and Society*, 7(4), pp. 403-451.
- David Samuels, 2004, “From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and the Transformation of the Worker’s Party in Brazil.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37(9), pp. 999-1024. [Link](#)

**Tuesday, February 26: Designing an Electoral System (*in-class exercise*)**

**Thursday, February 28: Federalism, Decentralization, and Participatory Governance**

- Alfred Stepan, 1999. “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US model,” *Journal of Democracy*, 10(4). [Link](#)
- Catherine Boone, 2004, “Decentralization as Political Strategy in West Africa,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 36 (4), pp. 355-380.
- Gianpaolo Baiocchi, “The Citizens of Porto Alegre,” *Boston Review*, March/April 2006. [Link](#)

*First individual memo due; begin preparing first group briefing*

**Tuesday, March 5: Governing Across Divides**

- Arend Lijphart, 1996, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: a Consociational Interpretation,” *American Political Science Review*, 90 (2).

- Arend Lijphart, 2004, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (2), pp. 96-109.
- Peter Siavelis. 2006. “Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy,” in Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, *Informal Institutions and Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 33-55. (on course web page)

### **Thursday, March 7: Group Briefings**

### **Tuesday, March 12: Societal Actors I: Social Movements**

- Doug McAdam, 1999, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, University of Chicago Press, pp. 36-59 and 146-180
- Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1999, *Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 89-110. [Link](#)
- E. E. Schattschneider, 1975, *The Semisovereign People*, Dryden Press, pp. 1-19.

*Second assignment handed out*

### **Thursday, March 14: Societal Actors II: Labor Unions and Public Policy**

- Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, 1991, “Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance,” *American Political Science Review* 85(2), pp. 539-556. [Link](#)
- Martin Rhodes, 2001, “The Political Economy of Social Pacts: Competitive Corporatism and European Welfare Reform,” in Paul Pierson, *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, Oxford University Press, pp. 165-194.

*Spring Break*

### **Tuesday, March 26: Welfare I: The Welfare State**

- Esping-Andersen, 2007, “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,” in Christopher Pierson and Francis Castles, eds., *The Welfare State Reader*, Polity Press, pp. 154-168.
- Jacob Hacker, 2002, *The Divided Welfare State*, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1, pp. 5-27.
- Torben Iversen and Anne Wren, 1998, “Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy,” *World Politics*, 50(4), pp. 507-546. [Link](#)

### **Thursday, March 28: Welfare II: Welfare in Developing Countries**

- Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar, 2010, “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon,” *World Politics*, 62(3), pp. 381-421. [Link](#)
- Hunter, Wendy and Timothy Power, 2007, “Rewarding Lula: Executive Power, Social Policy and the Brazilian Elections of 2006,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 49 (1), pp. 1-30. [Link](#)

*Second individual memo due; begin preparing second group briefing*

**Tuesday, April 2: Group Briefings**

**Thursday, April 4: Accountability and Corruption**

- O'Donnell, Guillermo, 1999, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," in *The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, edited by Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 29-46.
- Gabriella R. Montinola and Robert W. Jackman, 2002, "Sources of Corruption: A Cross-country study," *British Journal of Political Science* 32, pp. 147-170.
- Lily L. Tsai, 2007, "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China," *American Political Science Review* 101 (2), pp. 355-372.  
[Link](#)

**Thursday, April 9: In-Class Final Exam**