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Tax Incentives, Compliance, and Enforcement

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Tax Incentives, Compliance, and Enforcement

This topic introduces students to the major challenges associated with managing compliance and enforcement efforts. It considers the impact of new public management, and the limits of a customer service approach to government attempts to regulate behaviour. Students are introduced to the concepts of risk profiling and targeting. This topic examines the importance of values like fairness, consistency, proportionality and predictability to an effective, fair and legitimate approach to the management of compliance and enforcement (Atlas). According to the Australian Government’s Greenhouse and Energy Officer, managing compliance “is about encouraging stakeholders to voluntarily comply and dealing with contraventions appropriately” (Atlas).

Core Concepts associated with this Topic: Labour Productivity

Recommended Reading

Harvard PED-210 Public Finance in Theory and Practice

Howard Husock, Seeking Neighborhood Revitalization in Philadelphia: Using Tax Credits to Link the Private and Non-Profit Sectors.

Howell H. Zee, Janet G. Stotsky, and Eduardo Ley, “Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries,” in World Development, vol. 30, no. 9 (September 2002), pp. 1497-1516.

Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, “Written Statement Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Hearing on Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easier and Collecting What’s Due,” June 28, 2011. http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_testimony_taxgap_062811.pdf

S.M.S. Shah and J.F.J. Toye, “Fiscal Incentives for Firms in Some Developing Countries: Survey and Critique,” in Bird and Oldman, Taxation in Developing Countries, Fourth Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp.151-63.

Glenn P. Jenkins and Chun-Yan Kuo, Evaluating the Relative Impact of Fiscal Incentives and Trade Policies on the Returns to Manufacturing in Taiwan, 1955-1995, QED Working Paper No. 1060 (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, April 2006. http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1060.pdf

Joel Slemrod, “Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion,” in The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 25-48. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.21.1.25

Richard A. Musgrave, “Reaching the Hard-to-Tax – Income Taxation of the Hard-to-Tax Groups,” in Bird and Oldman, Taxation in Developing Countries, Fourth Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 297-309.

Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl, and Ingrid Wahl, “Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The ‘Slippery Slope’ Framework,” Journal of Economic Psychology 29 (2008), pp. 210-25.

James Alm, John Deskins, and Michael McKee, Third-Party Income Reporting and Income Tax Compliance, Working Paper 06-35 (Atlanta: Georgia State University, March 2006). http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/2006/downloads/AlmDeskinsMcKee_ThirdParty.pdf

 

Page created by Sean Goertzen on 18 April 2015.

 


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School of Public Policy and Governance