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Game Theory and Rational Institutionalism

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TEACHING TOPICS IN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTINS AND POLICY PROCESS
Actors, Interests and Lobbying
Administration and Governance
Administrative Law and Constitutional Checks on the Executive
All-Powerful Leaders?: The Concentration of Power in Modern Executives
Bureaucracy and the Formulation of Public Policy
Canadian Intergovernmental Structures and Operating Processes
Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations of Third Sector Governance and Management
Courts, Judicial Review, Rights and Democracy
Democracy
Emergence of the Nation State
Executive Authority, Cabinet and Leadership
Executive Leadership in Government
Executive-Legislative Relations
Federalism
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations
Federal-Provincial-Municipal Relations
Game Theory and Rational Institutionalism
Indigenous Rights and Institutions
Institutional Architecture: Federalism
Institutional Designs and Paths
Machinery of Government
Media, Framing and Agenda Setting
New Public Management
Parliamentary, Presidential and Decentralized Unitary Systems
Political and Administrative Responsibilities
Political and Administrative Responsibilities
Political Parties and Elections
Probing the Accuracy of Rational Decision Making Models: Alternative Accounts
Public and Para-Public Institutions
Public Institutions, Organizing Principles and Democratic Control
Public Opinion, Ideas and Policy Frames
Representation and Accountability
Representation and Responsiveness
Representation, Accountability and Policy
The Architecture of the Canadian State
The Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic Behaviour
The Changing Role of the State
The Democratic Deficit: Ethics, Responsiveness and Performance
The International Context of Domestic Institutions
The Policy Cycle
The Political Context of Policy Making
Weber: Rationalization and Bureaucracy
Westminster Parliamentary Systems
Who are the Players in the Policy Process?

 

A Teaching Topic in Democratic Institutions and Policy Process

Game Theory and Rational Institutionalism

This topic introduces deals with game theory, and considers how it can be used to help analyze and predict the actions of governing institutions and specific actors working within them. Students are introduced to some of the most important examples of game theory, including the “tragedy of the commons,” to show why the actions of multiple self-interested actors often lead to socially sub-optimal results. Further, students consider the ways in which institutional designs can influence policy outcomes.

Recommended Reading (University of Toronto PPG-1001)

Gibbons, Robert. 1997. “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 1: 127-149.

Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.” American Economic Review 100: 1-33.

Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289- 325.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 493-535.

Weingast, Barry. 1995. “A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation.” Politics and Society 23: 449-464.

Source: PPG-1001 Syllabus, 2013.

Page created by: Ben Eisen, last updated 23 February 2013.

 

 

 

 


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School of Public Policy and Governance