A Teaching Topic in Democratic Institutions and Policy Process
Game Theory and Rational Institutionalism
This topic introduces deals with game theory, and considers how it can be used to help analyze and predict the actions of governing institutions and specific actors working within them. Students are introduced to some of the most important examples of game theory, including the “tragedy of the commons,” to show why the actions of multiple self-interested actors often lead to socially sub-optimal results. Further, students consider the ways in which institutional designs can influence policy outcomes.
Recommended Reading (University of Toronto PPG-1001)
Gibbons, Robert. 1997. “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, 1: 127-149.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.” American Economic Review 100: 1-33.
Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25: 289- 325.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 493-535.
Weingast, Barry. 1995. “A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation.” Politics and Society 23: 449-464.
Source: PPG-1001 Syllabus, 2013.
Page created by: Ben Eisen, last updated 23 February 2013.